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Opening with a consideration of the distribution of the two graphic acts – drawing and writing – 
this article offers a comparative study of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy’s respective 
exhibitions and catalogue essays on the subject of drawing. Through a comparative examination 
of what I take to be their central theoretical contributions to the study of drawing – Derrida its 
‘rhetoric’, Nancy its ‘rhythm’ – this article moves on to suggest how these concepts inform a theory 
of poetic lineation.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION: KAFKA’S WRITING-PAD 
A brief event in Kafka’s The Trial provides me with a point of entry into thinking the irruptive 
relation between writing and drawing. Oblivious to the content of the charges against him, K. 
resolves to write an impossibly comprehensive plea for his defence anyway. He is interrupted by 
the deputy manager, who bursts into his office, laughing: 
at a Stock Exchange joke he had just heard, a joke which 
required for its understanding a drawing which the deputy 
manager, taking the pencil from K.’s hand and leaning over 




In the case of K.’s plea, a response to an inscrutable mobilization of juridical power, we are offered 
a parody of the scene of writing. That is, if writing is understood as an accounting of the self, made 
through a manual act of inscription, traced with a linear movement of differentiation which is both 
graphic and syntactic. What this illustrative episode presents might be reduced, thus, into a 
preliminary and provisional graphic order. Writing, emblematized by the plea, is consequential, 
patient, and difficult, oriented towards inscribing the line of the self. Drawing, emblematized by 
the joke, is flippant, throwaway, and facile, oriented towards inscribing the line of the other. If 
manual writing proceeds along the projected, invisible lines of an intention, those lines are always 
liable to disintegrate into the lines of the drawing; in one there inheres the in-eliminable possibility 
of the other. Additionally, rather like the charges against K., we are left to guess at the actual 
contents of the joke and its drawing. Famously, for Freud, the pleasure in telling a joke is derived 
less from the particulars of content than from the economic ‘savings’ that it yields: typically because 
the psychic energy that would otherwise have been spent on maintaining the inhibition of libidinal 
or aggressive energy is momentarily relieved.2 K. assumes the role of the Freudian third person, 
who isn’t there to get the joke but to be told it: to provide the joke-teller with the requisite subject, 
or medium, for the pleasure of telling.3 In other words, in the telling, K. has the same function as 
the writing-pad in the drawing. In each case, the subjectifying operation of drawing takes place 
according to a logic of exclusion.  
What this scene has to do with Derrida and Nancy is that, in its sketchy economy, it marries 
their respective pre-occupations regarding the philosophy of drawing: that is, for Derrida, the 
notion of substitution, of the significant implication of drawing within the logic, or the ‘graphics’, 
of supplementarity, and for Nancy, drawing as the formation and medium of pleasure. Indeed, 
parts of Nancy’s The Pleasure in Drawing (Le plaisir au dessin) explicitly resume the thinking of The 
Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious in order to outline the co-extension of the emergence of 
aesthetic pleasure and the inauguration of form. Furthermore, despite the rarefied circumstances 
of the art exhibitions that serve as the bases for these two texts, Derrida and Nancy are not 
3 
 
motivated by connoisseurship: the claims they make apply equally to expert drawings as they do 
to children’s (or, for that matter, bank manager’s) drawings. The core of this article is a comparative 
reading of Derrida’s and Nancy’s accounts of drawing, particularly Nancy’s The Pleasure in Drawing 
(first published in French in 2007 as Le Plaisir du dessin) and Derrida’s Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-
Portrait and Other Ruins (first published in French in 1990 as Mémoires d’aveugle: L’autoportrait et autres 
ruines). Much has been written on the complex proximities of these two thinkers, particularly the 
ways in which Nancy’s thinking both enters and departs from the orbit of deconstruction.4 That 
Derrida and Nancy alike turn towards abstracted accounts of drawing while curating exhibitions 
of graphic works remains an unexamined comparative encounter. In focussing on this, I am not 
just motivated by the intrinsic local value of reading these texts alongside each other in the context 
of a broader consideration of the overlapping or diverging contours of these two philosophical 
projects. I am motivated too by a demand of what I have referred to in the title as a poetics of 
drawing, which refers rather literally to the ways in which theories of drawing lend themselves to 
theories of poetry. Both Derridean and Nancean versions of drawing, I will argue, sponsor such a 
poetics, in different but complementary ways: Derrida with what he calls the ‘rhetoric of the trait’, 
and Nancy through an enigmatic consideration of the rhythm of drawing.  My work here will be 
oriented towards developing these concepts.  
In terms of the wider context of this comparison, the shift from drawing to poetry may 
seem an abrupt veer. But, I argue, drawing, the art of non-linguistic line-making and marking, is a 
privileged other of poetry, the art of lineated language.5 If the history of modern poetry is, partially, 
the history of its migration, as a medium, from speech to paper, then it is too a history of its 
increasing proximity to the graphic arts.6 This is not just a theoretical proposition: it is a 
demonstrable preoccupation for poets, too. Yves Bonnefoy, for example, develops the analogy in 
the metaphor, not of the writing-pad, but of the common ground of the blank sheet: ‘drawing is 
less defining contours, finding their truth, than venturing into that whiteness and discovering there 
the precarity of all that has been acquired […] and thus drawing near to that reality-unity that 
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language robs us of. In this way, the drawing, the “great” drawing, will be poetry [emphasis mine]’.7 
Bonnefoy’s projection of poetry as the apotheosis of drawing comes from his predication of those 
two forms not on their fulfilment of certain media-specific formal requisites and limits (‘defining 
contours’), but instead on a common epistemological sensibility, anterior to the work, towards the 
withdrawal of received form.  
This, in turn, recalls Walter Benjamin – oft-cited in literary-critical approaches to drawing 
- whose gesture, like Bonnefoy’s, is towards a pure definition of drawing. For Benjamin, what 
distinguishes drawing from painting is its taking place against, and activation of, an unexhausted 
‘background’. ‘The graphic line,’ he writes, ‘marks out the area and so defines it by attaching itself 
to it as a background […] The pure drawing will not alter the meaningful graphic function of its 
background by “leaving it blank” as a white ground’.8 For a drawing to be a drawing, for Benjamin, 
the intervention of the mark must coincide, dialectically, with a commensurate letting-be of the 
background: a finite marking of an unfilled field. The drawing subjects the ‘area’ it appropriates as a 
background, in the senses of both domination and constitution (it is exactly this dual sense that 
Derrida develops with his distinct but comparable term for the material support of the drawing, 
taken from Artaud: the ‘subjectile’).9 Art historians might shrug this all off as commonplace, or as a 
mere rehash of the classical disegno/colore distinction, but time and again, one of the elements that 
draws philosophers, poets and literary theorists to the abstraction of a pure graphic art, is this 
interplay with, variously, the ‘whiteness’, the ‘writing-pad’, the ‘subjectile’, or the ‘background’: the 
simultaneous ground and negation of form which it, not coincidentally, shares with writing in 
general and poetry in particular. Nancy and Derrida pursue their versions of drawing against this 
backdrop.  
 




In the case of both of these texts, it is necessary to bear in mind their geneses as extended catalogue 
essays. I will, therefore, begin with a brief overview of the exhibitions. Mémoires d’aveugle: 
L’autoportrait et autres ruines was the name of the exhibition curated by Derrida at the Louvre in 
1990, as part of the gallery’s Parti-pris (‘Taking Sides’) series. Each exhibition in the series was 
curated by, as the catalogue puts it, a ‘personalit[y] known for their critical abilities’.10 The idea was 
that each invited personality would take their pick from the Louvre’s graphic arts collections to 
assemble a discursive exhibition, meditating on the ‘argumentative value’ of the selected works. 
Underpinning this format is the notion that drawing, as a field of conceptualization in visual art, 
may lend its generative potential to the theoretical treatise (Hubert Damisch’s exhibition was 
entitled, appropriately, Traité du trait). It is perhaps owing to the precepts of the Parti-pris series that 
Derrida’s book is so literally thematic: a treatise on drawing and blindness that finds its visual 
material, mainly, in drawings of the blind.11 Of the works exhibited, of particular note are studies 
of the blind by Antoine Coypel, a series of searing self-portraits by Henri Fantin-Latour, and 
Joseph-Benoit Suvée’s Butades, or the Origin of Drawing.  
Nancy, meanwhile, curated the exhibition Le Plaisir au dessin with Sylvie Ramond and Eric 
Pagliano at Lyon’s Musée des Beaux-Arts in 2007. In contrast with Derrida’s exhibition, the Lyon 
exhibition foregrounded the graphic act itself over possibilities of representation. In keeping with 
this, whereas Derrida thematizes drawings of the blind, Nancy thematizes drawings of the hand 
(but, as Nancy seems keen to point out in the exhibition press release, he eschewed, in his curation, 
any overall thematization).12 A significant proportion of the drawings exhibited are autographic, 
scribbly and spontaneous: the first image is an untitled 1966 ink drawing by Joan Miró, composed 
of four rapid strokes of varying lengths, and a few spare blobby drops. There are, too, examples 
of Surrealist automatism, including by its most enthusiastic practitioner, André Masson. This is 
mentionable because Nancy’s proposal that drawing constitutes the spontaneous and libidinal 
inauguration of form arguably finds its most apt artistic precedents in that practice.  
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Neither thinker is invested in what art historian Benjamin Buchloh, in a significant essay, 
calls the ‘diagrammatic’ turn in drawing in the wake of Cubism.13 Here, Buchloh seeks to shift the 
critical focus away from the material support – undoubtedly a preoccupation in twentieth-century 
Western art – and towards other dialectical frontiers. If, as Buchloh argues, drawing conforms to 
a dialectic between ‘the authentic corporeal trace and the externally established matrix’ (52), then 
Nancy and Derrida alike dispense with the latter, as well as any other notion of extrinsic interaction 
or dialectic, for the sake of clearing the way for a unilateral philosophy of the line considered 
against nothing other than the plain sheet of paper, the material support, as a stand-in for 
ontological ground. Both, of course, are licensed to be tendentious by the constrained format in 
which their narratives of drawing take place: relatively small exhibitions drawn largely from 
museum collections of works on paper. Notwithstanding this, central to Buchloh’s argument is 
the claim that the diagrammatic has been historically occluded in favour of, among other 
prominent, epistemic motifs, ‘mimesis of libido’ (52): a phrase which provides as good a 
description as any for what Nancy sets about recuperating for drawing in his essay. This is to say 
that, like Benjamin’s, Nancy and Derrida’s basis for thinking drawing is rather lacking in art 
historical perspicacity, but in any case they are less interested in drawing’s place in visual art than 
they are in a fundamental relation to writing, language, and signification.  
 
 
DERRIDA AND THE ORIGIN OF DRAWING 
Derrida’s writing on drawing orbits around Pliny the Elder’s famous account, in the Natural History, 
of the origin of drawing.  The same scene as that depicted in the Suvée painting included in the 
Louvre exhibition, Pliny tells the story of the daughter of a Corinthian potter named Butades who, 
enamoured with a young man who was soon ‘to go abroad’, drew ‘in outline on the wall the shadow 
of his face thrown by a lamp’.14 As Derrida will develop, this provides a model of the graphic line 
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– or trait – as both a traced outline and the mark of an affect or intention. The Plinian origin of 
drawing is thus essentially and acutely melancholic, in the sense that, as Giorgio Agamben 
succinctly defines it, ‘melancholy offers the paradox of an intention to mourn that precedes and 
anticipates the loss of the object’.15 Drawing thus becomes an anticipatory marking of melancholy 
that persists after the loss of the object.  
Derrida’s first encounter with the Plinian scene comes via his reading of Rousseau in Of 
Grammatology. As Derrida notices, Pliny lies behind Rousseau’s aphorism, early in the Essay on the 
Origin of Languages, that ‘love […] is the inventor of drawing’.16 Rousseau’s broader point, famously, 
is that gesture originates from need and language originates from passion.17 Butades’ daughter thus 
presents a kind of intermediate expression, between need and passion: neither pure gesture nor 
language, but a gestural inscription that, if not forming the basis of language, at least elicits or 
creates the conditions for imagined or supposed linguistic equivalents. Rousseau evokes this 
trajectory in a passage that is important for Derrida’s reading: ‘How she could say things to her 
beloved, who traced his shadow with such pleasure! What sounds might she use to work such 
magic! [Quels sons eût-elle employés pour rendre ce movement de baguette?]’ (6).18  
As an indexical trace, drawing seems as indicative of the possibility of language as it is of 
the phenomenal appearance that it seeks, melancholically, to reproduce in outline. It is this twofold 
quality of the trait that Derrida lingers on, although, inevitably, it is less an indicative capacity than 
it is an indicative incapacity. Derrida writes at length about Rousseau’s rendering of the Plinian 
scene as the ‘origin of the sign’, where the twofold incapacity is staged as the co-incidence of the 
twofold activity of tracing and marking:19  
The movement of the magic wand [in French, baguette – i.e., stick, stylus] that traces with 
so much pleasure does not fall outside of the body. […] It is of course still an image 
which is traced at the tip of the wand [au bout de la baguette], but an image that is not 
completely separated from the person it represents […] The distance from the shadow 
or from the wand is almost nothing [n’est presque rien]. She who traces, holding, handling, 
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now, the wand, is very close to touching what is very close to being the other itself, close 
by a minute difference [à une infime différence]; that small difference—visibility, spacing, 
death—is undoubtedly the origin of the sign and the breaking of immediacy; but it is in 
reducing it as much as possible that one marks the contours of signification. 20  
The trait records, for Derrida, a fantasy of presence. Note that Derrida’s language is not of 
negation, but of proximity and approximation, through the tactile figures of the tip of the baguette 
and the shadow (even the image is framed not in terms of visibility, but in terms of contiguity). 
Drawing, in the first instance, appears to represent the closest possible adequation of a fixing of 
presence. However, everything hinges on the mordant irony with which Derrida writes that the 
minute difference between tip and line, figure and shadow, is synonymous with nothing less than 
‘visibility, spacing, death’, that is, the instantiation of difference itself, and the radical dissolution 
of wholeness that is necessary for signification. This is why drawing, for Derrida, cannot be 
considered akin to, say, a zero degree: while there is a scale of proximity between subject and 
object, there is no accompanying scale of signification: all graphic activity is equally implicated in 
the unlimited proliferation of supplementarity. The variable (and unpresentable) spacing between 
the drawer and the drawn is superseded by the invariability of spacing itself.  
The possibility of ‘marking’ the ‘contours of signification’ (or the ‘stroke’ that opens up 
‘grammaticality’, as Derrida puts it earlier) is distinct from the mimetic, metonymic proximity of 
tracing (OG, 209). To mark implies a retrospective function, in the sense of commemoration (the 
French marquer shares this with the English verb). Whereas tracing originates from a will to 
reproduce the contours of a beheld object, marking unintentionally inscribes and commemorates 
an incipient formation of meaning-making itself, insofar as the intention to signify, rather than 
being realized as a presentation of the other, is realized as a kind of memorial of its own 
impossibility. In other words, the mark, intransitive, makes the origin of signification – the opening 
of form, situated here ambiguously between gesture and language, passion and need – visible. It 
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abandons signification to visibility, in the same way that the drawing is an abandonment of gesture 
to the trait.   
This abandonment is what Michael Newman, writing in a deconstructive mode, is 
developing when he formulates ‘an undecidability of the relation between mark and signifier’, 
which ‘would open up the possibility of a continuity between the human and the non-human’.21 
For Derrida in Grammatology, the significance of drawing is that the resistance to that continuity or 
undecidability is maintained from within by the same graphic gesture that surrenders to it. That is 
to say that when Derrida writes that ‘Man calls himself man only be drawing limits excluding his 
other from the play of supplementarity’ (OG, 244), we should understand ‘drawing’ literally as 
much as figuratively.  
I will move on to Memoirs of the Blind. What Derrida will go designates here as ‘the rhetoric 
of the trait’ – a rhetoric that is both proper to drawing and a product of it—is an expansion of the 
line of thought, in his reading of Rousseau, but rearticulating the deconstructive approach to 
graphism within the matrix of visibility, as opposed to that of contiguity. Appropriately for an 
exhibition catalologue, the text foregrounds the act of looking. Returning to the Plinian origin, 
Derrida’s reading of the scene is refracted not through Rousseau, but through Suvée’s painting. In 
this reading, Butades’ daughter tracing the shadow of her beloved becomes a scene of orphic 
aversion. Since Butades’ daughter must avert her gaze from her beloved in order to trace his 
shadow, for Derrida, ‘it is as if seeing were forbidden in order to draw, as if one drew only on the 
condition of not seeing, as if the drawing were a declaration of love destined for or suited to the 
invisibility of the other’ (MB, 49).  
The drawing of Butades’ daughter becomes an illustration of Derrida’s central polemic, in 
Memoirs, that ‘the heterogeneity between the thing drawn and the drawing trait remains abyssal’ 
(45). As an illustration of that thesis, it is, admittedly, a rather counter-intuitive one, since the scene 
unavoidably presents the straightforward coincidence of the seen and the traced. Butades’ daughter 
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averts her eyes from her lover, but never loses sight of his shadow. The point, of course, is that 
there is necessarily always some displacement, in the same way that the logic of supplementarity 
ensures that any relation to the other cannot be extricated from an abyssal referral back to the 
self.22 Derrida writes: ‘Butades writes [écrit], and thus already loves in nostalgia’ (45).23 She does not 
draw (dessine); she writes. Thus we have a reversal of Kafka’s writing-pad, that is, the sudden 
substitution of drawing by writing. If drawing proceeds as an anticipation of loss, its immediate 
replacement by writing takes place, in part, as an instant petrification of that anticipation into 
nostalgia (again, the commemoration of the mark).  
Memoirs of the Blind tells various versions of this – drawing giving way to writing - which I 
am tempted to refer to as graphic events. Perhaps the most compelling of these events is 
autobiographical. Referring to his boyhood jealousy of his brother’s superior draughtsmanship, 
Derrida writes: ‘I suffered seeing my brother’s drawings on permanent display […] As if, in place 
of drawing […] I was called by another trait, this graphics of invisible words, this accord of time 
and voice that is called (the) word—or writing, scripture. A substitution, then, a clandestine 
exchange: one trait for the other, a trait for a trait’ (MB, 37). Here, like Butades’ daughter, Derrida 
writes in -- and as -- a nostalgia for drawing. His anecdote takes place on the same ‘sacrificial’ level 
as the portraits of blindness assembled for the exhibition, that is, it proffers a thematic 
representation of an unpresentable origin, an originary substitution in the metaphor of a volitional 
exchange. Note how, this time, the substitution of the trait is a passage of recourse from the 
visibility of the displayed drawings through to, via a renunciation of sightedness, writing as a 
graphic system whose object is essentially withdrawn.  
Derrida characterizes this inextricable relation between drawing and writing, via the trait, 
as a rhetoric for perhaps two reasons. Rhetoric implies a sustained reliance on the substitutions of 
figural language as well as it implies a temporal movement of discursivity (the operative phrase 
being Derrida’s ‘accord of time and voice’).24 In these two senses, rhetoric, for Derrida, captures 
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the quality of drawing as, itself, a figure of writing –its trace – and the quality of drawing as the 
ambivalent record of a discrete movement or gesture –its mark. To return to the question of non-
human mark-making, in Memoirs of the Blind, it is precisely the rhetoric of drawing that distinguishes 
it from non-human marking, since drawing ‘never goes without being articulated with articulation, 
without the order being given with words […] Drawing comes in the place of the name, which 
comes in the place of drawing: in order, like Butades, to hear oneself call the other or be called 
(by) the other’ (MB, 57). 
Drawing is ‘articulated’ – partially detached but conjoined - with articulation itself, that is, 
the nascent intent to signify. According to Derrida, drawing becomes less an art form than a form 
of address, or form as address: a form founded on the way in which it is co-formed with other 
modes of address. Here, the chiasmic relation or exchange that drawing occupies with naming – 
yet another graphic irruption – is a consequence of the status of drawing as, at once, the opening 
and abandonment (hence the ‘ruin’) of the possibility of address and, therefore, of an ethical 
encounter with the other. 
 
THE RHYTHM OF DRAWING 
Whereas Derrida broaches the domain of poetics through a shared ‘graphics’ of drawing and 
writing, Nancy’s account of drawing broaches a poetics through an enquiry into the fundamental 
relations between forms of art. This distinction extends to their critical engagements. While 
Derrida’s approach to drawing, from Grammatology to Memoirs, circles around the Plinian origin 
(whether mediated through Rousseau or through artistic representation) as both sign and 
spatiotemporal inscription, perhaps the most instructive inclusion in one of Nancy’s ‘sketchbooks’ 
is a brief passage from Heidegger’s ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. These sketchbooks – 
collections of brief and unannotated quotations on the subject of drawing from artists, writers and 
philosophers - follow each section of The Pleasure in Drawing, function as resonant interruptions, 
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and effectively extend Nancy’s curatorial project into text. The ‘sketch’ or scrap excerpted from 
‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ is Heidegger’s exposition of the linear movement of the Aufriss, 
the ‘rift-design’, that is, the twofold movement of drawing on and drawing from by which the work 
of art – sculpture, painting, poem – is instantiated between the phenomenal ‘world’ and the 
material ‘earth’: ‘to draw out the rift and to draw the design with the drawing-pen on the drawing-
board’ (PD, 35).  
My reading is that, with Heidegger, drawing generally relates less to the graphic matrix than 
it does to the broader architectural register present in his turn to language: the formational 
foundation (Heidegger tends to refer to it as Zeichnung – drawing, draught) from which ‘the house 
of Being’ is realised.25 Nancy modifies and extends a Heideggerian approach to drawing, inasmuch 
as his thought of drawing sponsors a thinking of the originary and formational movement that 
gives rise to all art media. Unlike Heidegger, he is, at the same time, concerned with thinking 
drawing as such (despite his reliance on figures of draughtsmanship, Heidegger omits the 
draughtsman from his roster of artists – not unlike Hegel’s exclusion of drawing in his lectures on 
aesthetics, where painting is allied with colore only). Philosophical influence aside, The Pleasure in 
Drawing is an elaboration of a line of thought initiated by Nancy in The Muses, that is, defining the 
whole aesthetic realm according to a radical heterogeneity of arts that Nancy calls, 
characteristically, a ‘singular plurality’. 26 In organising his graphic aesthetics around a Freudian 
principle of pleasure, Nancy rehabilitates the practical handbook cliché of drawing as a source of 
idle pleasure. To provide some context, the association between drawing and pleasure has 
significant antecedents in French art history, too; Joyce Bernstein Howell demonstrates, for 
example, that Eugène Delacroix established the precedent that practising drawing can be a 
democratic source of pleasure for anyone, thereby breaking with the contemporary doxa that 
pleasure is experienced according to a strange polar logic, that is, either by viewers or by masters 
practising their craft.27 That democratic ideal of availability remains present in Nancy’s 
configuration of drawing as the humble essence of all artistic expression.   
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Nancy identifies the graphic impulse as the defining element of what he calls an essential 
‘gesture of art’, where gesture might be understood as a single, unrepeatable, and necessarily 
somatic expression made from within a circumscribed field of possibility. As Ginette Michaud 
glosses it in her perceptive exposition of Nancy’s text: ‘drawing is the artistic gesture par excellence: 
an act, a passage, not as acting out, but as passage of the act itself, its on-the-spot actualization’.28 
Like Derrida, Nancy is drawn to drawing as an intimate performance of immediacy, as the locus 
of a contraction between subject and object, and as both art and act. But unlike Derrida’s abyssal 
‘minute difference’, at the tip of the stylus, Nancy’s evocation of the drawing subject reproduces a 
version of sameness, the sameness of a body, guaranteed precisely by the technicity of the stylus. 
Drawing, he writes, offers ‘an immanent signifiance […] without the sign taking off toward the 
signified, but a sense that is offered right at the body [à même le corps]’.29 Nancy is quick to clarify 
that his argument is not for a naïve privileging of actual somatic presence: ‘this gestural body is 
different from the organic body, without being a body without organs. Rather, it becomes the 
body-organon of art; and thus of the technique (ars-techné) that is in play’ (PD, 39). If Deleuze and 
Guarrati’s concept of the body without organs is a virtual body, then Nancy’s body-organon is 
distinguished as a technical body (the Greek organon referring both to the instrumentality of tools 
and the instrumentality of the vital organs), a body which produces and which is produced by --
and which only ever exists in and as this simultaneity -- a given work of art, irrespective of medium.  
To a greater degree than Derrida, Nancy remains sensitive to the polysemy of the French 
word dessin as both drawing and design, and thus both form and concept. In this sense, he retains a 
fidelity to the Renaissance conception of disegno, according to which drawing was venerated as the 
twofold capacity of art to represent and to invent. The source of invention and creation, disegno 
was correlated with divinity; as David Rosand puts it, particularly in the case of Leonardo, ‘disegno 
comes to be recognized not only as the means of realizing ideas but as the very source of ideas 
itself’.30 But when divorced from the religious faith in which the discourse of disegno is ultimately 
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an investment, the co-determinacy of means and source, as with Nancy’s body-organon, comes to 
resemble a lacuna or an event, an irruption of form, an ‘opening’.  
Indeed, The Pleasure in Drawing is, primarily, a treatise on form, where form is dynamized 
and temporalized in chiasmic relation with what Nancy refers to as ‘force’: ‘the formative force of this 
very form [of drawing], or again, of the form in its force […] is what constitutes the drawing of art or 
the art of drawing’ (PD, 12). All form, for Nancy, is perpetually unfinished: a discrete artistic form 
does not exist in phenomenal or aesthetic autonomy, but rather as a fleeting, fragile instance of a 
continual and inexhaustible emergence of sense. It is for this reason that Nancy locates a theoretical 
resonance in Freud’s economic account of pleasure since, as he puts it, pleasure, whether libidinal 
or aesthetic, ‘comprises a renewed dynamic, revived by the desire to which it responds’ (17). That 
pleasure, and thus form, are generated by an inexhaustible cyclicality of desire and ‘revival’ provides 
the background for what Nancy will go on to call the ‘rhythm’ of drawing, where rhythm stands 
for an interruptive countermovement inherent to the formative force of drawing.  
The triumvirate of rhythm, form, and pleasure is well-trodden territory in the field of 
poetics. In his intervention into the theory of the lyric, Jonathan Culler argues that rhythm plays a 
supplementary role in lending the experience of reading lyric poetry a kind of embodied 
experience. ‘Rhythm,’ he argues, ‘gives lyric a somatic quality that novels and other extended forms 
lack—the visceral experience of rhythm linking it to the body—[…] and thus contributes to a 
different sort of pleasure’.31 While the specific kind of pleasure derived from reading poetry and 
‘experiencing’ rhythm may be one of the criteria for a theory of lyric form, Nancy would have that 
pleasure, rhythm, and form are connected in a more primary way. ‘Rhythm’, Nancy writes, 
prescriptively, ‘whose double value of scansion and schema (ruthmos initially had a meaning close to 
“figure”) could no doubt be brought to express a pulse of nascent form—should find its place in 
the analysis of drawing’ (PD, 50). In understanding ruthmos as a concatenation of scansion and 
schema, Nancy finds a succinct formulation for his account of graphic and aesthetic form, and one 
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which inevitably relies for its expression on the language of poetics. Scansion, normally understood 
as the graphic representation of metre, becomes instead the graphic trace of rhythm itself; not the 
rhythm of phonetic patterns, but the rhythm of thinking and forming. Meanwhile schema, that is, 
form itself (and, in Kantian philosophy, the rule by which an intuition is correlated with an external 
object), comes to name the process or ‘force’ of formation implied by this graphic account of 
rhythm.  
Nancy’s recommendation in The Pleasure in Drawing of an association between drawing and 
rhythm develops some of his earlier work in philosophical poetics. In ‘Taking Account of Poetry’, 
collected in the 2006 volume Multiple Arts: The Muses II, Nancy suggests that poetry can help to 
uncover an ‘articulation that precedes language’, which ‘no doubt functions as something akin to 
“rhythm”, “cadence,” “caesura,” or “syncope” […] and, at the same time, has the quality of what 
I would term, so as not to call it “figuration,” an outline [dessin]’.32 Here, Nancy anticipates the 
basic premise of The Pleasure in Drawing – an opening of sense and form that may be distinguished 
from linguistic structures of meaning-making and their discontents via an elaboration of the 
gestural, conceptual, and formal qualities of drawing.  Here, rhythm is allied with other terms from 
prosody, whose technical specificities are elided in favour of the essential way in which they each 
stand for an interruptive force that is necessarily both linguistic and extra-linguistic (the value of 
prosody for Nancy is that it places a focus on elements of speech that cut across phonetic units). 
Nancy goes on to extend the equivalence between rhythm and drawing in a later essay on 
Hölderlin, highlighting the way in which both are formed negatively: ‘Rhythm is made of anti-
rhythm, like the figure its outline’.33 Crucially, the connection that Nancy draws between ‘rhythm’ 
and ‘dessin’ cuts across temporal and spatial orders of form. Note, in comparison, the strikingly 
similar equivalence made by Ezra Pound in his ABC of Reading: ‘Rhythm is a form cut into TIME, 
as a design is determined SPACE’.34  
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Nancy’s approach to rhythm or ruthmos emerges from a long philosophical history. In a 
helpful essay on philosophical approaches to rhythm, David Nowell Smith focusses on 
Heidegger’s 1939 lecture on Aristotle’s Physics, in which Heidegger interprets ruthmos as designating 
‘the temporal structure by which the entity remains in appearance’.35 For Nowell Smith, the 
evolution from ruthmos to rhythm is a product of a subtraction of temporality from form or schema: 
‘The transition from ruthmos to what we would today recognize as “rhythm” can only take place 
once the notion of form (schema) has been detemporalized, made static: the remaining temporal 
element—now grasped as flux, or flowing—gets named “rhythm”’ (45). Nancy’s post-
deconstructive rethinking of rhythm aims, precisely, to re-temporalize form, as well as it does to 
formalize temporality. Belonging as much to thinking as it does to the body, the generative and 
plural rhythm of drawing is Nancy’s answer to Derrida’s argument that drawing constitutes the 
abyssal instantiation of difference. Drawing, he writes, ‘must be understood as engaging a rhythm, 
setting in play a beat, a differentiation, displacements, folds’: between the arts, between bodies, 
between lines (PD, 70). 
 
CONCLUSION: GRAPHIC TRAIT, POETIC LINE 
I will work towards a conclusion by opening onto a broader consideration of how the two 
accounts of drawing may be put to use in a more direct analysis of poetic form – specifically, the 
formal unit of the line. In so doing, I am not aiming for a climactic synthesis -- I hope I have 
already demonstrated how Derrida and Nancy’s texts are theoretically distinct, and how, moreover, 
these texts instantiate broader differences between their thought. However, when it comes to the 
relation between graphic trait and poetic line, Derridean rhetoric and Nancean rhythm become 
complementary factors. As I have already suggested, a corollary of Derrida’s notion of the rhetoric 
of the trait is that the irreducible possibility of the substitution of drawing by writing and vice versa 
is, in fact, a constitutive experience of both graphic modalities. To write is to mourn drawing, to 
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draw is to mark possibilities of writing. Echoing his evocation of Butades’ daughter writing in 
nostalgia, Derrida asks, ‘Does one ever get over drawing, is one ever done mourning it?’ (MB, 39). 
The implication of this chronic mourning is that there remains a fundamental aesthetic question 
or motivation at the heart of writing. What I want to suggest is that poetry can provide a mode of 
writing that partakes in and formalizes this mourning (that, as it were, marks it) without 
overcoming it. But if we import the logic of the rhetoric of the trait, we might think of the form 
of the poem as an expression of the continuity, and thus a suspension, of what Derrida calls the 
‘clandestine exchange’ of the graphic trait for the written line. Derrida writes that ‘drawing always 
signals […] toward the threshold where only the surroundings of the trait appear’ (MB, 54). The 
trait becomes something like the formless generator of form, the gesture that engenders form 
through what it excludes. The line break in the poem, meanwhile, performs an analogous function. 
Axiomatically, poetic form is negative, in that it derives not from the line but from the break. 
Poems may resist or subvert the principle of lineation, and may indeed jettison it altogether, but 
even in prose poems, as James Longenbach has argued, the line persists as a kind of phantom 
formal referent.36 This, in turn, belongs to the same supplementary chain of negation that opposes 
writing to drawing in a dynamic of nostalgia or mourning. In other words, poetic lineation 
represents a flipside of Derrida’s rhetoric of the trait, insofar as it is a disarticulation or 
decomposition of the trait that is inevitably articulated with it, and which inevitably refers back to 
it.  
On the other hand, Nancy’s account of rhythm foregrounds the way in which poems, like 
drawings, derive their organising energy or ‘formative force’ from the dynamic accretion of finite 
lines. This is what the poet George Oppen refers to as the ‘pulse of thought which is given by […] 
lines’.37 Nancy addresses the poetic line directly in an interview with Emmanuel Laugier, employing 
the distinctly Heideggerian metaphor of field-tilling to characterise the movements of what he 
refers to as verse: ‘versus, the reversal of the plough at the edge of the field and the verses as furrows 
that turn back when they reach the enclosure’ (EPL, 114). For Nancy, the finitude of the line 
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literally signifies our own finitude as mortals. Beyond the particularities of metre, we feel, and view, 
the rhythm of poetry as such: ‘The verse allows death to be heard at the point of the break, the 
terminus of the line’ (EPL, 115). This does not predicate the line on its verbal or syntactic qualities 
but, instead, on its non-verbal, non-syntactic qualities. To avail myself of one of the double-values 
that both Derrida and Nancy exploit in their respective essays - the French word retrait, which 
signifies withdrawal or retreat, as well as the reinscription of the trait (PD, 73) - the poetic line is 
precisely a of retrait. Enjambment enacts – or figures – the supersession of the trait by the poetic 
line, while at the same time re-inscribing the logic of the trait as a mark of finitude.  
 To return to the discussion I initiated in the introductory section of this essay, graphic and 
poetic line are, in a sense, antithetical. Lineated writing subsumes the graphic line and, conversely, 
the graphic line – Paul Klee’s ‘active line on a walk, moving freely, without goal’ – mocks, in its 
activity, the syntactic constraints of lineated writing.38 Tim Ingold puts it starkly: ‘Linearization 
marks not the birth but the death of the line’.39 This, in turn, implies an expanded field, according 
to which poetry is no longer the opposite of prose – drawing is. Poetry, instead, occupies a position 
that is not quite intermediary, but is a mode of writing that interrupts, decomposes, and makes a 
virtue of linearization, and in so doing provides visual and rhythmic figurations of the kind of 
aspects of drawing that Derrida and Nancy both dwell on. Here, finally, ‘rhetoric’ and ‘rhythm’ 
can be re-appropriated to refer to the ways in which the poetic line functions as an ambiguously 
figurative unit: figurative, in the case of Derrida’s rhetoric, of the continuity between drawing and 
writing; and conversely, in the case of Nancy’s rhythm, of finitude – a finitude that is figured by 
the recurring termination of lines. In this sense, rhetoric and rhythm, continuity and finitude, 
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